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Abstract
The logic–linguistic structure of quantum physics is analysed. The
role of formal systems and interpretations in the representation of na-
ture is investigated. The problems of decidability, completeness, and
consistency can affect quantum physics in different ways. Bohr’s com-
plementarity is of great interest, because it is a contradictory propo-
sition. We shall see that the flowing of time prevents the birth of
contradictions in nature, because it makes a cut between two differ-
ent, but complementary aspects of the reality.
PACS: 03.65.-w Quantum mechanics; 03.65.Bz Foundations, theory of
measurement, miscellaneous theories; 02.10.By Logic and foundations.
1 Introduction
The foundations of physics, the quantum logic, the interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics: since the beginning, quantum theories gave rise to a broad
variety of studies not properly defined studies devoted to settle the proper-
ties of this new branch of physics. Studies about quantum logic started in
1936, with the work of Birkhoff and von Neumann [3] and continued with
many solutions, such as three-valued logics or unsharp approaches [2], [25].
However, several authors, even though with some differences, point out that
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quantum mechanics does not require a new non-classical or unconventional
logic [18], [30], [31]. Studies about the interpretation of quantum mechanics
are quite plethoric [25], [50]. A widely accepted interpretation is the so called
“Copenhagen interpretation”, initially developed by Niels Bohr and Werner
Heisenberg, among others. However, the debate is still alive. There is no
fundamental disagreement among physicists on how to use the theory for
practical purposes, such as to compute energy levels, transition rates, etc.
[35]. Problems arise on the concepts of quantum theory.
Many authors asked for a new language, different from the everyday one.
Bohr stressed the difficulties of all means of expressing ourselves: human
beings are “suspended in language”, as he used to say (see [37]). People
strive to communicate experiences and ideas to others and to extend their
field of descriptions, but this should be done in a way so that messages do not
become too ambiguous. As far as the definition of experiment is concerned,
Bohr said that it is a situation where it is possible to tell others what has
been done and what has been learned and thus, observations results should
be expressed in an unambiguous language [6].
The problem of the language of physics is not trivial. It could seem a
negligible detail, because traditional philosophy regarded language as some-
thing secondary with respect to empirical reality. Still today there are many
physicists believing that elementary particles are as real as an apple or a
grapefruit can be (see [21]); Asher Peres emphasizes that experiments do not
occur in a Hilbert space, but in a laboratory [35]. Many times one makes the
mistake to search the meaning of a word or a symbol as something coexisting
with the sign: there is a (con)fusion between substance and substantive [52].
The distinction between the mathematical symbol and the physical ob-
ject is of paramount importance, because it allows to define what physics is.
Mathematics is a language, invented by mankind, that we use to speak about
nature and not the nature itself. Niels Bohr said that physics is simply what
we can say about nature, not a way to find out how nature is (see [37]).
There is no doubt about the existence of a world, but we must consider that
no experience can be understood or communicated without a logic–linguistic
frame. Both scholars and scientists elaborate ideas and report on the results.
To make this they need of, at least, two languages: mothertongue and math-
ematics. We must learn to use them as any other laboratory instrument.
In this paper the reader does not find something of practical or predictive.
We would like, in agreement with Bohr, to say something about nature by
using the language of mathematics. A grain of knowledge, hoping that it
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will be a granum salis. We have never seen something like the elaboration
exposed in this paper and even though some things in the following sections
may appear trivial, we think it is necessary to review them, in order to fix
some definitions and notations at least. We hope it will be useful to see some
old concepts in a different way. Moreover, we would like to point out a new
possible definition of the concept of the time.
2 Formal systems
Before going on, let us recall some notions of formal systems. It is possible
to distinguish between formal logistic systems and interpreted languages. In
the first case, syntactical rules are sufficient to determine the system, in the
second one semantic rules are also necessary. Generally speaking, a formal
system is constituted by [22], [23], [28]:
1. a complete list of formal symbols or signs with which the expressions
are formed;
2. an explicit, or also recursive, definition of what a well-defined formula
is and what a term is;
3. a numerable set of well-defined formulas taken as axioms;
4. some metamathematical definitions, called rules of inference, which al-
low the transformation of formulas in other formulas or show what is
an immediate consequence of a formula;
5. a list of formulas which can be derived with a finite number of appli-
cations of the rules of inference;
6. a list of sentences that allow us to shorten long expressions;
7. a list of sentences about the language that explicitly shows the deno-
tation properties and, particularly, an indication of what expressions
they denote and the circumstances in which an expression denotes a
particular object.
Let us indicate the first type of formal system (formal logistic system or
calculus) with the symbol FS(⊢), where ⊢ is the well known symbol for formal
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deduction. FS(⊢) has the properties from 1 to 6 indicated above. We then
indicate a formal system with semantics, or an interpreted language, with
the symbol FS(⊢, |=), where |= is the symbol for the semantic deduction.
FS(⊢, |=) has the proprieties from 1 to 7 indicated above. The statement
n. 7 is present for semantic systems only.
Now it is possible to construct several languages for various purposes,
from everyday talking to science languages [8], [9]. It should be pointed out
that there is a small difference between the list of mathematical logic and
the alphabet of a language: in the second case, with a given interpretation,
many of the formal symbols correspond to entire words and phrases rather
than to a single letter [22]. The postulates and axioms for mathematics can
be found in [22].
Statement n. 7, which makes the distinction between calculus and its
interpretation, leads us to make a distinction between two types of truth,
logic truth and factual one [9]. Truth in mathematics (a formal logistic
system) is indipendent from the objects of the world and must be valid for
every possible interpretation. Truth in physics (an interpreted language) is
considered factual: a sentence is true when it corresponds to reality. This
distinction is extremely important: in 1931, Tarski showed that it is possible
to define truth only in purely formal languages [44]. Truth in an interpreted
language cannot be defined inside the language itself. Tarski reported an
useful example: the sentence “it is snowing” is true if and only if it is snowing.
One must look out of the window whether it is snowing. This definition
of truth must be extended according to Peirce, so that both for logic and
factual truths it is possible to say that a proposition is true if, and only if,
it is true what it explicitly and implicitly declares [33]. This is of paramount
importance in science: it is thanks to this definitions that we can explore
things outside our direct experience. For example, we can say that a black
hole exists, even if we cannot directly observe it, because its existence follows
from true propositions.
It is necessary to point out that mathematics is an interpreted language,
even though the truth in this case is a logical one, because it is not possible
to verify it with any external reality. A triangle is a geometric interpretation
of a formal object in a certain formal logistic system, but it does not exist in
reality. We can find objects with triangular shape, but not triangles.
Therefore, being physics an interpretation of the mathematics, we can
conclude that it is an interpretation of an interpreted language. A semantics
of a semantics. Objects in physics does not exists in reality, only as approx-
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imations. In physics there is difference between a fluid and the water, in
the same way as in mathematics there is difference between triangles and
triangular–shaped objects.
In conclusion, we can always speak about truth in the language (inter-
preted or not), rather than truth with direct reference to the world.
3 Some features of formal systems
Main features of a formal system are decidability, completeness and consis-
tency. As known, at the beginning of the XX century, the German mathe-
matician David Hilbert presented a list of problems, among them there were
[20]:
1. Decidability (Entscheidungsproblem), i.e. a formula A is decidable if
⊢ A∨ ⊢ ¬A.
2. Completeness (Entscheidungsdefinitheit), i.e. every closed formula of
the formal system is decidable.
3. Consistency (Widerspruchsfreiheit), i.e. there are no contradictory for-
mulas (⊢ A∧ ⊢ ¬A).
Even though decidability is introductory to completeness, this problem
was solved later, after the problems of completeness and consistency. Indeed,
in 1931 Kurt Go¨del solved problems 2 and 3 [17], while in 1936, Alan Turing
[47] and Alonzo Church [12], indipendently solved question 1. Probably this
gives the misleading impression that the Entscheidungsproblem is implied in
Go¨del’s work, thus without the Church–Turing thesis.
Go¨del demonstrated that in a formal system, like that set up by Whit-
head and Russell in their book Principia Mathematica or like the Zermelo–
Fraenkel–von Neumann axiom system of set theory, there are propositions
undecidable on the basis of system’s axioms, so that these formal systems
cannot be complete (in the Go¨del’s paper this is stated in Theorem VI). This
is valid for a wide class of formal systems, in particular for all systems that
result from the two just mentioned with the addition of a finite number of
axioms, i.e. those systems that fulfil the previously listed statements, from
1 to 6. As Go¨del wrote, in a note added 28 August 1963, the characteristic
property of a formal system is that reasoning in them, in principle, can be
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completely replaced by mechanical devices [17]. Later on Tarski extended
these results also to interpreted languages [45]. It is worth noting that the
undecidability of a proposition can be skipped by stating an axiom that de-
fines whether that proposition is true or false. However, even in such a new
formal system there will be a new undecidable proposition. In order to have
a complete formal system, we should have an infinite number of axioms.
Moreover, it is necessary to note that in this case we have implicitly
assumed that the formal system is consistent. But, as Go¨del himself showed
in his famous paper, the consistency of the formal system is not provable in
the formal system itself (this is stated in the Theorem XI) [17].
Go¨del’s results were later generalized by Church and Turing and used
to solve the decision problem, which is closely connected to the problem of
completeness, as we have already seen. The Entscheidungsproblem consists
in finding a general algorithm, which would enable us to establish whether or
not any particular sentence can be proved within that formal system. Church
[12] and Turing [47] showed that this is not possible.
4 The logical structure of physics
Let us consider the logical structure of physics and the role of language.
We recognize the existence of a reality, but to study it, to investigate it, to
communicate our results, we need a language. The word does not change
reality, but influences our way of thinking. It is necessary to analyze the
relationship among words and things, physics and reality.
When children learn to talk, they correlate an object to a word: they
give a meaning to a word and begin to believe that language is meaning-
based. Only later they will know that language is syntax-based. For example,
inserting the word ‘only’ into all possible positions in the sentence:
I helped Mickey Mouse eat his cheese last week.
it is possible to see that the meaning is a function of the syntax. During its
“childhood”, physics was a correlation between an object and a mathemat-
ical symbol. It is then possible to speak about physics as interpretation of
mathematical symbols, just like when we speak about the meaning of a word.
Galileo Galilei wrote that physics is like a great book written in mathemat-
ical language, whose characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical
figures [16]. Later on, Charles Sanders Peirce founded the logic of relations,
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noting that any deductive science establishes an isomosphism between the
logic of nature and the logic of the language we employ to explore it [32].
A correlation is possible when objects can be found in the everyday life
and everybody can see them. It is possible to make a correlation between an
apple and the word ‘apple’. Anyone can see, touch, smell, eat or hear (when it
falls down) an apple: we can use our five senses to know the apple. Therefore,
there is no doubt about the meaning of the word ‘apple’; moreover it must
be stressed that there is a correlation only and not a (con)fusion between an
apple and the word ‘apple’.
The correlation is not so clear when we speak, for example, about elec-
tromagnetism. Nobody can see, touch, smell, eat or hear a radio wave: it
is necessary to use an instrument, the radio receiver, in order to hear radio
waves. The use of analogies based on everyday life can be misleading, as
known from the hydrodynamic model of electric current.
Things become more complicated when we speak about quantum me-
chanics. The esigence of observing a world outside our direct experience and
with instruments that must be within human beings’ reach, forces us to em-
phasize the experiment procedure [35]. Only certain things are observable
and this happens only after an irreversible act of amplification, such as the
blackening of a grain of silver bromide emulsion or the triggering of a pho-
todetector: what we choose to measure has an inavoidable consequence on
what we shall find [49]. It is possible to correlate a mathematical symbol
only to those “observables”, i.e. only observables can have a meaning. All
other mathematical symbols or words used in quantum mechanics do not
have any meaning. The esigence of abstraction must be emphasized.
Let us consider an example: the d’Alambert wave equation, which can
be written as following:
∂2ψ(r, t)
∂t2
− c2∇2ψ(r, t) = 0 (1)
This equation shows that there is a logical link among the symbols indicated.
This link is formal and then indipendent from meaning. Then, Eq. (1) can
be used in several branches in physics, according to the meaning that one
gives to used symbols. The function ψ can be correlated, even though with-
out a one-to-one correspondence, with pressure, velocity, velocity potential,
displacement of matter points from equilibrium in a solid, electric field, mag-
netic induction or the corresponding potentials. Moreover there are many
other interpretations of Eq. (1) (for examples, see [26]). The interpretation
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of other symbols follows as a consequence of the choice of interpretation of
ψ. It should be noted that the interpretation does not directly concern the
Eq. (1), but through the boundary conditions or through the initial values.
However, it should be stressed that the wide application field of the wave
equation does not derive from its physical interpretation. Starting with an
interpreted wave equation one can obtain misleading results. For example,
one cannot consider pressure waves analogous to electromagnetic waves: in
the first case there are some consequences absent in the second one (e.g. the
supersonic “bang”). The formal character of physics, and of any deductive
science, is due to the fact that when deducing a theorem from the postulates,
it is necessary to avoid any specific property of the interpretation and to use
only those formal properties which are explicitly stated in postulates (and
therefore, belong to every interpretation of the formal system) [46]. The final
conclusion is that every theorem of a given deductive theory is satisfied by
any interpretation of the formal system of this theory [46].
Let us now consider the Schro¨dinger wave equation:
ih¯
∂ψ(r, t)
∂t
+
h¯2
2m
∇2ψ(r, t)− Uψ(r, t) = 0 (2)
It must be noted that ψ, at this stage, has no meaning and it is not possible
to find anyone. As known, it is necessary to make further operations on ψ.
For example, the probability dP to find an electron in a volume dV centered
in the point r is:
dP = |ψ(r)|2dV (3)
There is no strict correlation between the symbol and the object. It
should be underlined that experiments are always macroscopic, because they
must be readable by a human being. We cannot see an electron directly, but
we can observe some effect on some instrument. This does not involve any
particular logic or physical law, but a strong attention to the interpretation.
The question of the correlation between a physical object and a math-
ematical symbol in quantum theory gave rise to a wide debate. The most
famous one occurred between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr and is syn-
thetized in the EPR paradox [5], [14]. Already in the initial words of the
Einstein, Podolski and Rosen’s paper [14] it is possible to see the authors’
conception the physics: each element of reality corresponds to an element in
the theory. This type of physics is strongly based on the meaning of a word or
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a symbol. Bohr’s reply shows that this conception is ambiguous and then, it
can generate paradoxes [5]. Bohr underlined that quantum mechanics forces
us to a radical revision of the traditional idea of an absolute physical reality,
as Einstein’s relativity led us to abandone the idea of an absolute space. In
each experiment, owing to the impossibility of discrimination, between who is
the observer and what is observed, the experiment became simply a situation
where we can tell others what we have done (see also [4], [6]). Experimental
procedures must be strictly specified in order to minimize ambiguities.
Physics is then an interpreted language that we use in order to say some-
thing about nature (see [37]) and the syntax of this language is isomorphic
to the logic of nature. Physics is constructed, as every language, following
the rules listed in Section 2. We can then write that classical physics is a
semantic system, FS(⊢, |=), where only the experiment can tell if a sentence
is true. The system must be consistent, that is each provable formula must
be valid. It is possible to write that a formula A is said to be true when:
if ⊢ A then |= A (4)
that is the consistency condition. Eq. (4) says that this conditional statement
is an implication, that is |= A is true under all conditions for which ⊢ A is
provable. It is also possible to say that the provability of ⊢ A “forces” |= A
to be true.
On the other hand, the completeness condition says that each valid for-
mula is provable. By using symbols:
if |= A then ⊢ A (5)
Realists think that only Eq. (5) is valid in physics. When the semantic
deduction is absent, as in quantum mechanics, realists force the existence
of |= A, according to their own logic. In doing this, realists find paradoxes,
that, however, are in assuming their own logic as the semantic deduction
isomorphic to the one of the nature.
Indeed, in quantum mechanics, the main problem is the measurement,
that is to find a meaning for mathematical symbols. First of all, it is worth
noting that the existence of the Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle restricts
the variables that can be measured simultaneously [19]. It should be noted
that even in classical physics it is not possible to measure two variables, or
more, simultaneously, owing to experimental uncertainties; nevertheless, tak-
ing into account the smallness of these uncertainties with respect to macro-
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scopic variables, it is possible to assume that the measurement are simultane-
ous. In quantum mechanics, in addition to experimental uncertainties, there
is also Heisenberg’s principle, that allows to measure canonically conjugate
quantities simultaneously only with a characteristic indeterminacy.
This feature called for a new concept of measurement, developed and
analyzed by several authors during this century [6], [7], [35], [48]; see also in
[50]. However, Bohr [6] (see also [37]) and, later, Peres [35], wrote against
the existence of a “quantum measurement”; Bohr designed, in a semi-serious
style, a series of devices that should serve to make these measurements [6].
It is necessary to stress that an experiment is always macroscopic, in order
to be accessible to a human being. We never directly observe a microscopic
variable: nobody has very seen a single photon, but only some macroscopic
irreversible effects. In order to explain these effects, we use quantum me-
chanics, from which we can reconstruct a visualization of a process outside
our direct experience.
The postulates of quantum mechanics stated by von Neumann [48] are
often considered as providing an interpretation in themselves, but it is nec-
essary to restrict the notion of interpretation and to give a meaning only to
those words or symbols which have referents, that are always macroscopic
in order to be reachable by human beings. These axioms and postulates are
widely dealt in those books and we refer to them for readers interested in
further investigations.
Having a formal system, we can apply Go¨del’s procedure and make the
arithmetization of the quantum theory. To do this, we must assign an integer
to a sequence of signs or to a sequence of sequences of signs. For example, it
is possible to use the number 5 instead of the word ‘not’ or 9 instead of ‘for
all’, and so on. Notions such as ‘formula’ and ‘provable formula’ can now
be represented by integers or sequences of integers. This method is today
commonly used: in a computer we represent all concepts by using sequences
of 0 and 1 only. Indeed, Turing used Go¨del’s numbers in order to construct
his famous machine, that is the logical basis of modern computers [47].
Now it is not necessary to repeat the proof of incompleteness: it is suf-
ficient to have shown that quantum theory is a formal system and then
incompleteness logically follows, as shown by Go¨del. The extension of in-
completeness to physics is quite straightforward, as underlined by Svozil by
means of other techniques [43].
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5 Complementarity, Indeterminacy, Contra-
dictions
Many scientists tried to see in physics reminiscences or analogies with Go¨del’s
theorems: Peres and Zurek looked for analogies with quantum theory [34],
[36]; Svozil extended incompleteness theorems to physics by using Turing’s
proof [43]; Komar investigated the quantum field theory [24]; Casti examined
the interconnections between chaos and Go¨del’s theorem [10] and last, but
not least, Chaitin analysed incompleteness in information theory [11]. It
is worth to note the works by Chaitin [11] and Svozil’s [43]: they suggested
that incompleteness was natural and widespread rather than pathological and
unusual. Particularly, Svozil extended undecidability to physics, by means
of the Turing’s proof [43].
Scientists often connected undecidability with Heisenberg’s indeterminacy
(uncertainty) in physics. However, undecidability does not mean uncertainty,
even though they can be linked somehow. It is possible to demonstrate
that uncertainty cannot be undecidable: for example, let us consider the
uncertainty relation for position and momentum:
∆x∆p ≥
h¯
2
(6)
This proposition holds, while the negation of the uncertainty principle, i.e.:
∆x∆p = 0 (7)
does not hold. We recall that, a formula A is said to be undecidable when
it is not possible to prove nor A neither ¬A. For uncertainty we can prove
Eq. (6), but we cannot prove Eq. (7), where Eq. (7)= ¬ Eq. (6). Then,
uncertainty is not an undecidable proposition.
Other scientists believe that physics cannot be subjected to Go¨del’s the-
orems because it has variables of a higher order, such as experimental data,
but Tarski has already shown that this is not sufficient [45]. Morevoer, Svozil
recently showed that undecidability is present in physics, so that it cannot
be complete [43].
We want now to explore the consistency of quantum physics and a partic-
ular feature, Bohr’s complementarity, taking into account the logic–linguistic
analysis carried out untill now. It is necessary to analyze also some implicit
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postulates, holding in physics: for example, all propositions must be consis-
tent. As a consequence of Go¨del’s Theorem XI (it is not possible to prove
the consistency of a formal system within the system), condition (4) must be
assumed as an axiom:
Axiom 1: if ⊢ A then |= A
Another implicit axiom is that each event is unique (i.e., there is only
a single world). As we know from Heisenberg’s indeterminacy, it is not
possible to measure simultaneously position and momentum, while Bohr’s
complementarity tells us that, even though particle and wave behaviour are
mutually exclusive, they are also complementary [4]. There is no well-defined
proposition that states what complementarity is. Bohr wrote:
The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to re-
gard the space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality, the
union of which characterizes the classical theories, as complemen-
tary but exclusive features of the description, symbolizing the ide-
alization of observation and definition respectively. [. . . ] we learn
from quantum theory that the appropriateness of our usual causal
space-time description depends entirely upon the small value of
the quantum of action as compared to the actions involved in
ordinary sense perceptions [4].
We must stress the importance of time in this quotation, that Bohr re-
called also in his reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [5]. The implicit
postulate of uniqueness of each event must be reformulated in:
Axiom 2: There is a single world at a time t.
Already at first sight, Bohr’s complementarity can be seen as a contradic-
tory proposition because, for example, an electron cannot behave simultane-
ously as a particle or as a wave. In the famous experiment of the double slit,
we can observe interference (wave) if there is no specification of which path
(particle). But if the path is specified, then the interference will disappears.
During these last years, there was a vivid debate around complementarity: it
started with some experiments carried out by Scully et al. [39], where they
claimed to have observed the simultaneous behaviour of waves and particles,
avoiding the indeterminacy principle. This episode could be dramatic for
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physics, because a simultaneous observation of wave and particle behaviour
would contradict the implicit Axiom 2. Some years later, Storey et al. replied
that the Heisenberg’s principle is valid and then Scully et al. were wrong [41].
This was followed by a letter of Englert et al. [15], to which Storey et al.
soon reply [42]. Moreover, Wiseman and Harrison wrote a letter in which
they claimed that both groups were right [51].
It is worth to note that in all these discussions no adequate attention was
given to time. The indeterminacy principle says that, at a given time t, we
can observe, with sufficient precision, one canonically conjugate variable only:
position or momentum, particle or wave. When we prepare an experiment,
we choose what we want to observe, particle or wave. This is equal to select
a particular interpretation (semantic deduction) for the formal system. Let
us consider these two propositions:
• A = “an electron behave like a wave”
• B = “an electron behave like a particle”
which are complementary, as known. Owing to the fact that at a time t we
must have a single world, it is possible to write that:
B = ¬A (or A = ¬B) (8)
Let us suppose that we set up an experiment to observe, say, the particle
behaviour of an electron. So B is true, while A = ¬B is false. In a second
time, we can set up a new experiment to detect the wave behaviour of the
electron. In this case, A is true, while B = ¬A is false. If we want to
construct a formal system for quantum mechanics we should select one of
these behaviours, but it is not possible to set up an experiment that allows
to decide whether A or B is always true. We have that both can be true and
false: this is a contradiction.
Time is the only thing that prevents the birth of a contradiction in nature.
The flowing of time makes the existence of two different aspects possible,
avoiding the contradiction of a simultaneous existence (intuitively we could
see time as a “cut” in space). Neglecting time in quantum mechanics could
then lead to contradictory propositions, because both A and ¬A (or B and
¬B) simultaneously hold and this contradicts Axiom 2. Time creates a cut
between two different, but complementary aspects of reality. It is also pos-
sible to deduce that we cannot unificate physics under a single description:
we need both waves and particles.
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6 Time in quantum mechanics
“How much time”, “It took quite some time”, “There is plenty of time”.
These are some examples only of our common way to think about time: an
interval between two instants. In physics as well time is seen as an inter-
val. Asher Peres stressed that the measurement of time is the observation of
a dynamical variable, which law of motion is known and it is uniform and
constant in time [35]. There is a kind of self–reference in this definition and
nothing is said about time. On the other hand, time is considered simply as a
parameter and, according to this, the above definition is completely satisfac-
tory. Moreover, time is sometimes neglected (e.g. steady state phenomena),
which is useful to understand some physical concepts.
However, when we deal with quantum mechanics the problem of the time
explodes in all its complexity. In classical mechanics (hamiltonian formu-
lation) the dynamical state of a physical system is described by a point in
a phase space, that is we have to know position q and momentum p at a
given time t. Even though it can appear a sophism, it is not possible, strictly
speaking, to know simultaneously q and p of any object. However, in classi-
cal physics, we may neglect variations during the lapse of time between the
measurement of q and p, because the quantum of action is so small when
compared to macroscopic actions. It is very interesting to note how Som-
merfeld stressed this question when he wrote about the Hamilton’s principle
of least action: the trajectory points q and q+ δq are considered at the same
time instant [40].
In quantum mechanics this approximation is not valid, because actions
are comparable with the quantum of action. The hamiltonian formalism is
not anymore a useful language to investigate nature and, as known, it was
necessary to settle quantum mechanics.
The impossibility to neglect time in quantum mechanics is well described
by the Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy. Nevertheless, the role of
the time in quantum indeterminacy is often neglected. In the history of
physics, we can often find authors which claimed to have found a way to
avoid the obstacle of indeterminacy. However they all missed the target,
that is the question of the time. Heisenberg clearly stated that indeterminacy
relationships do not allow a simultaneous measurement of q and p, while do
not prevent from measuring q and p taken in isolation [19]. It is possible to
measure, with great precision, complementary observables in two different
time instants: this is not forbidden by Heisenberg’s principle. Later on, it
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is also possible to reconstruct one of the observables at the reference time
of the other observable, but this is questionable. In the interval between
two measurements observables change because time flows. What happened
during this interval? We can reconstruct observables by making hypoteses,
but we have to remember that these are hypoteses and not measurements.
We have to take into account the so–called “energy–time uncertainty re-
lationship”. As known, time is a c–number and therefore it have to commute
with each operator. Nevertheless, the relationship exists, but it is worth to
note its dynamical nature, whereas indeterminacy is kinematic [1]. That is,
it follows from the evolution of the system during the measurement. Bohr
had already stated this and he had often pointed out the time issue [4] [5],
along with Landau and Peierls [27]. We refer to [27] in which the question is
stated in a better way. The relationship:
∆E∆t > h¯ (9)
means that we have to consider the system evolution during the measure-
ment, that is the difference between the measurement result and the state
after the measurement. The energy difference between the two states can-
not be less than h¯/∆t. The energy–time relationship has important conse-
quences particularly as regards the momentum measurement and, therefore,
on double–slit experiment [27].
Eq. (9) suggests that, given a certain energy, it is possible to construct
a state with a huge ∆E in order to obtain a very small ∆t. However, in a
recent paper, Margolus and Levitin [29] give a strict bound that depends on
the difference between the average energy of the system and its ground state
energy. Is it a step toward a quantization of the time?
In addition, if we consider the equation of motion (written with Dirac’s
notation [13]):
ih¯
d|Pt >
dt
= H(t)|Pt > (10)
we can see that H(t) is ih¯ times an operator of time–translation. If the
system is closed we can consider H constant and equal to the total energy of
the system; but if not, if energy depends on time, this means that the system
is under the action of external forces (e.g. measurement). The measurement
introduce an energy exchange that does not follow causality.
Moreover, it is worth to note that a closed system is an abstraction. A
real closed system is not observable, without introducing energy exchange
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which would change H : therefore that would not be a closed system. We
can say, by means of Rovelli’s words that there is no way to get information
about a system without physically interacting with it for a certain time [38].
Would you consider it a sophism? Of course not. We should always bear
in mind that quantum physics is only an interpreted language we use to
speak about Nature, though it does not describe Nature itself. In classical
physics we made many approximations, which are no longer valid in quantum
physics. In particular, we can no more neglect time. As Heraclitus stated,
you cannot plunge your hands twice in the same stream.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, the formal character of quantum mechanics is emphasized,
showing the clear distinction between mathematics and nature, words and
objects. As Bohr used to say, physics concerns what we can say about nature,
by using the language of mathematics. The interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, that is a correlation between a symbol and an object, is only a limit
process, because every experiment is macroscopic, in order to be reached to
human beings. Owing to its formal character, quantum theory is subjected
to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems.
Bohr’s complementarity can be a useful tool to investigate time, because
emphasize that the flowing of time prevent the birth of contradictions in
nature. Time makes a cut between two different, but complementary as-
pects of reality. The link between complementarity and time requires further
investigations.
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9 List of symbols
• ⊢: formal deduction;
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• |=: semantic deduction;
• ¬A: not–A;
• ∨: or;
• ∧: and.
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